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ARE BONUSES COMPATIBLE WITH
THE DEMING PHILOSOPHY?
BY

F. Case Whittemqre

Executive Masters of Business Administration Program
University of Richmond
April 1990

This paper examines the philosophy of Dr. W. Edwards
Deming to determine what principles of that philosophy should
apply to selecting a bonus compensation plan.

All types of

bonus plans, including the following incentive bonus plans
individual incentive, group incentive, gain sharing, profit
sharing and pay-for-knowledge
meet the Deming principles.

are examined to determine which
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I.
A.

INTRODUCTION

What Is the Deming Philosophy?
The United States can thank the Japanese for finding a

U.S. treasure, nurturing it to prominence in Japan and then
re-exporting it to the U.S.

That treasure is the Deming phi-

losophy, which was expounded by Dr.

w.

Edwards Deming.

The

backbone of the Deming philosophy is the following "14 Points
for Management":
1.

Create constancy of purpose toward

improvement of product and service, with the
aim to become competitive and to stay in
business, and to provide jobs.
2.

Adopt the new philosophy.

new economic age.

We are in a

Western management must

awaken to the challenge, must learn their
responsibilities, and take on leadership for
change.
3.

Cease dependence on inspection to

achieve quality.

Eliminate the need for

inspection on a mass basis by building
quality into the product in the first place.
4.

End the practice of awarding business on

the basis of price tag.
total cost.

Instead, minimize

Move toward a single supplier

for any one item, on a long-term relationship
of loyalty and trust.

-
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5.

------------------------------------------------,

Improve constantly and forever the

system of production and service, to improve
quality and productivity, and thus constantly
decrease costs.
6.

Institute training on the job.

7.

Institute leadership . .

The aim of

supervision should be to help people and
machines and gadgets to do a better job.
Supervision of management is in need of
overhaul, as well as supervision of
production workers.
8.

Drive out fear, so that everyone may

work effectively for the company . • . .
9.

Break down barriers between

departments.

People in research, design,

sales, and production must work as a team, to
foresee problems of production and in use
that may be encountered with the product or
service.
10.

Eliminate slogans, exhortations, and

targets for the work force asking for zero
defects and new levels of productivity.

such

exhortations only create adversarial
relationships, as the bulk of the causes of
low quality and low productivity belong to
the system and thus lie beyond the power of
the work force.

- 2 -
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lla. Eliminate work standards (quotas) on the
factory floor.

Substitute leadership.

b. Eliminate management by objective.
Eliminate management by numbers,
goals.

numeric~l

Substitute leadership.

12a. Remove barriers that rob the hourly
worker of his right to pride of workmanship.
The responsibility of supervisors must be
changed from sheer numbers to quality.
b. Remove barriers that rob people in
management and in engineering of their right
to pride of workmanship.

This means, inter

alia, abolishment of the annual or merit
rating and of management by objective
13.

Institute a vigorous program of

education and self-improvement.
14.

Put everybody in the company to work to

accomplish the transformation.

The

transformation is everybody's job.
(Deming 1986, pp 23-24).
Dr. Deming also warns management to avoid the following 7
"Deadly Diseases":
1.

Lack of constancy of purpose to plan

product and service that will have a market
and keep the company in business, and provide
jobs.
2.

Emphasis on short-term profits:

short-term thinking (just the opposite from
-
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constancy of purpose to stay in business),
fed by fear of unfriendly takeover, and by
push from bankers and owners for dividends.
3.

Evaluation of performance, merit rating,

or annual review.
4.

Mobility of management; job hopping.

5.

Management by use only of visible

figures, with little or no consideration of
figures that are unknown or unknowable.
6.

Excessive medical costs.

7.

Excessive costs of liability, swelled by

lawyers that work on contingency fees.
(Deming 1986, pp 97-98).
Although Dr. Deming is sometimes called a quality guru,
his philosophy is actually much broader than just ensuring
that products meet specifications through the use of statistical process control.

The main purpose of the Deming philoso-

phy is to transform management so that it will lead the way to
improved quality, productivity and profitability over the long
term.
B.

Who Is Dr. Deming?
Dr. W. Edwards Deming was a statistician in the U.S. Cen-

sus Bureau before World War II.

He helped improve the quality

of production during World War II.

Afterwards, American indus-

try was so busy riding the tidal wave of pent-up demand and
technological superiority developed by wartime necessity that
it was unreceptive to the Deming philosophy (Grayson 1988,
3 09) •
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The Japanese, however, were desperate.

Their country and

its economy were in ruins, their productivity was only 14% of
U.S. productivity (Grayson 1988, p. 61), and "made in Japan"
meant inferior quality.
for solutions.
industry.

The Japanese began an intense search

They made many trips to learn about U.S.

In July 1950, the Union of Japanese Scientists and

Engineers invited Dr. Deming to give an eight-day course to
340 Japanese research workers, engineers and plant managers.
In addition, he gave a special session to senior executives
from 50 leading Japanese manufacturing firms.

They listened

well and, with continuing guidatice by Dr. Deming and other
quality experts such as Dr. Joseph M. Juran, accomplished a
remarkable transformation of their manufacturing industries
into major world competitors.
The Japanese did not forget Dr. Deming's contribution.

In

1950, the Union of Japanese Scientists and Engineers established the Deming Prize to commemorate his contributions to
quality improvement in Japan.

Each year the Deming Prize is

awarded to a small number of corporations and plants, and
occasionally to individuals for unusual quality achievements.
The Deming Prize is now the "most coveted and prestigious
award for quality in Japan" (Grayson 1988, p. 309).
In the late 1970s and early 1980s when Japanese companies
were rapidly gaining U.S. market shares with superior quality
products, U.S. companies began to recognize that the post-war
honeymoon was over.

They began a frantic search for ways to

improve the quality of their products.

- 5 -

In a reversal of the

, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

late 1940s and early 1950s, U.S. managers went to Japan to
learn how the Japanese achieved such high quality.
that the answer was right at home--Dr.

w.

Some found

Edwards Deming.

In

the last decade he has become one of the leading spokesmen for
the growing quality movement in the U.S.

c.

Purposes of this Paper
Dr. Deming states that, by implementing his 14 Points,

management will lead the way to improved quality, productivity
and profits over the long term.

However, his writings give no

explicit guidance on whether management should share the
improved prof its with the employees, such as through a bonus
system.
This leads to the two r·.irposes of this paper.

The first

is to examine the Deming philosophy to determine what principles should apply to selecting a bonus plan that is compatible
with the Deming philosophy.

These principles are derived from

studying Dr. Deming's writings, especially his criticisms of
the traditional employee compensation system that bases pay
performan~e

raises on annual employee

appraisals.

The second purpose is to use those principles to evaluate
each type of bonus plan to determine which plans are compatible with the Deming philosophy.

This will provide guidance to

a firm that is implementing the Deming philosophy and wants to
select a bonus plan to share the improved profits with its
employees.

-
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II.

WHAT'S WRONG WITH TRADITIONAL COMPENSATION
SYSTEMS AND PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS?

The problem with traditional compensation systems, according to Dr. Deming, is that most pay raises are closely linked
to performance appraisals.

His criticisms of performance

appraisals and their linkage to pay raises are discussed in
this section.
Dr. Deming's distaste for performance appraisals is summarized in the following excerpts from his writings:
The most powerful inhibitor to quality
and productivity in the Western World is the
so-called merit system or annual appraisal of
people.

What it does is to destroy people.

Destruction of the people in a company leads
to destruction of the company.
(Deming

1~8

, p. 2).

When discussing the Western system of

annual performance appraisals and merit ratings, Dr. Deming
wrote:
It nourishes short-term performance,
annihilates long-term planning, builds fear,
demolishes teamwork, nourishes rivalry and
politics.
It leaves people bitter, crushed,
bruised, battered, desolate, despondent,
dejected, feeling inferior, some even depressed, unfit for work for weeks after receipt of rating, unable to comprehend why
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they are inferior.

It is unfair, as it as-

cribes to the people in a group differences
that may be caused totally by the system that
they work in.
Basically, what is wrong is that the
performance appraisal or merit rating focuses
on the end product, at the end of the stream,
not on leadership to help people.

This is a

way to avoid the problems of people.

A

manager becomes, in effect, manager of
defects.
The idea of a merit rating is alluring.
The sound of the words captivates the
imagination:

pay for what you get; get what

you pay for; motivate people to do their
best, for their own good.
The effect is exactly the opposite of
what the words promise.

Everyone propels

himself forward, or tries to, for his own
good, on his own life preserver.

The organi-

zation is the loser.
Merit rating rewards people that do well
in the system.

It does not reward attempts

to improve the system.
(Deming 1986, p. 102).

-
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Don't rock the boat.

Tom Peters (1985) expressed his agreement:

w.

Edwards Deming, the quality guru,

says performance appraisal is the No. 1 management problem in the United states.

He

contends that it takes the average American
employee six months to "recover" from the
typical performance appraisal.

That may be

an understatement.
A.

Performance Appraisals Demoralize Most Employees
The biggest problem with performance appraisals is the

psychological effect that they have on most employees.
people like to feel good about themselves.

Most

Therefore, most

consider themselves to be in the top one third or one half of
their peer group.
Most performance appraisals require each employee to be
placed in one of at least three groups.

Worse still, some

systems demand a forced ranking of all employees being rated.
For example, in a pay-for-performance system that was headlined in the January 26, 1988 edition of the Wall Street Journal, General Motors required its supervisors to place their
employees in the top 10%, the next 25%, the next 55% and the
bottom 10% of their group.

The system lasted only one year

and was replaced by a more flexible system.

The Buick-

Oldsmobile-Cadillac Group went even further and did away with
forced ratings (Moen 1989, p. 65).
Whether the performance appraisal system requires the
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employees to be placed in a few groups or a forced ranking,
most of the people in the top one third to one half will be
happy.

However, some will be disenchanted or, at least uncom-

fortable.

The happy ones are those who believe that the ap-

praisal system is fair, objective and consistent (Scholtes
1987, p. 11).

This group probably thinks, "I deserved it."

The remainder of the top one third will be disenchanted
because they do not think the appraisal system is fair, objective and consistent.

Recognizing that the appraisal system is

somewhat like a lottery, they are not able to enjoy their high
rating because they realize their turn to be in the lower two
thirds may come next year (Scholtes 1987, p. 11; Winstanley
1982' p. 38).
The psychological state of the employees who are placed in
the lower one half to two thirds is described by Peter R.
Scholtes as follows:
For almost all of those judged to be in
the lower two thirds or lower half, the
[appraisal] will probably come as a shock.
The news from the evaluator will be disillusioning and depressing, especially if the one
evaluated believes the appraisal system to be
fair, objective and consistent.

Of course,

if he or she does not see the [appraisal]
process to be fair, the worker will be bitter
and cynical about the judgement.

- 10 -
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This disillusionment can be devastating.

Drained of self-esteem and a good

self-image, workers' performance may get
worse.

They will feel less self-confident

and grow more dependent on supervision.

They

will be fearful, trying to second guess what
the supervisor is thinking.

This leads to

even worse performance, fulfilling the evaluator's prophecy.
(Scholtes 1987, p. 11).

Tom Peters says it even more

strongly, "there is simply nothing dumber (and more debilitating) than labeling one-third to one-half of your people
losers, which is exactly what virtually all forced-rankings
do" (1987, pp 495-97; see also Hughes 1986).
B.

Employees' Efforts to Improve Their Work Practices May
Hurt the Firm
Some employees in the bottom half or two thirds who are

not too disillusioned will try to figure out how to change
their work practices so that they will get a better
performance appraisal.
top group.

They may emulate those who were in the

However, what is good for one employee may be

inappropriate for another employee.

Therefore the employees'

attempt to improve performance may actually degrade their
performance.

Of course, that would hurt both the employees

and their firm (Deming 1986, p. 103).
For example, suppose salesman A, who has a few large accounts, got a high rating and salesman B, who has many, widely
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dispersed, small accounts, got a low rating.

B wants to

improve his rating and decides to emulate A.

B observes that

A makes many trips to visit his accounts.

B concludes that he

should travel more, rather than continue to handle his
accounts primarily by phone.

B increases his travel but his

sales volume drops because, while he travels and visits a few
customers, he ignores most of his former customers.

B's next

performance rating is even worse than his previous one and his
firm suffers because of lost sales.
c.

Performance Appraisals Encourage Mediocrity
Many performance appraisal systems require the employee

and supervisor to agree at the beginning of the year on certain goals by which the employee's performance will be measured.

At the outset, the employee negotiates hard to ensure

that he has "safe" goals, ones that he is sure to accomplish.
However, if he were fully motivated, he might far exceed those
goals.

Instead, the employee is likely to just exceed the

first year's goals and hold in reserve any potential gains to
ensure he will have goals that he can meet during the following year.

Thus the firm loses because performance improve-

ments are delayed so that the employee can set and achieve
goals each year (Scholtes 1987, p. 10; Brophy 1986).
D.

Pressure to Meet Goals May cause Sub-Optimization
When an employee is having or anticipates having difficul-

ty meeting a goal, that employee probably will take the necessary steps to ensure that he meets his goal, in order to get a
good performance appraisal.

Those necessary steps may put

- 12 -
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pressure on the system that causes distortions elsewhere in
the firm.

Presumably there is some gain to the firm from

having the individual meet his goal.

However, if that gain is

less than the losses to the firm caused by the distortions,
then there has been sub-optimization.
For example, to meet a quarterly sales objective, a
salesman may reduce prices in order to get customers to buy
early thereby sacrificing sales in the following quarter and
reducing the profitability on the accelerated sales.

In

another example, managers in a New York bank focussed
attention on direct labor costs in its back office by
measuring the number of transactions per employee and

ma.~·e

that factor a large part of the bonuses paid to line
managers.
thing.

As a result, line managers computerized every-

The number of transactions per employee went up and

staff shrunk, but data processing came under heavy pressure.
It boosted its staff, as well as its spending on hardware and
software.

The bank did not know if the savings in labor cost

in the back office compared to the additional costs in the
data processing department (Chew 1988, p. 111}.

In a final

example, a manufacturer of engine blades adopted a plan to
reward its workers for increased production.
the plan did not take quality into account.

Unfortunately
The employees

increased production dramatically but many of the blades had
to be reworked at great expense to the company (Perry 1988, p.
52} •
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E.

Performance Appraisals Inhibit Teamwork
As technology and business become more complex and sophis-

ticated, more tasks are being done by teams rather than by
individuals.

However, most performance appraisals are

an individual basis.

don~

on

This encourages the individual to do

whatever is necessary to improve his chances of getting a good
appraisal even if it hurts team unity or team output.

The

issue may be as simple as who should get credit for a new
idea.

From the standpoint of the firm, it makes little

difference who had the new idea.
important to certain team

membe~~

However, it may be very
in their performance

appraisal whether they can take credit.
for credit does not help the firm.

The ensuing struggle

In fact, it probably hurts

the firm because it causes animosity within the team and
distracts them from their primary efforts (Deming 1986, p.
107) •

This problem was well summarized by David

c.

Couper

(1988), chief of police of Madison, Wisconsin, who wrote:
Most work is the product of a group of
people--the process of rewarding an individual requires a pretense that the individual is working alone.

Rewarding indi-

viduals encourages "lone rangers" and is a
divisive influence in every organization.
You cannot measure people apart from the
systems in which they work.

Performance

evaluation, and tying pay to it, requires a

- 14 -
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process of appraisal that is fair, dependable, consistent and objective--otherwise, it
will be seen as rewarding favorites at best,
or a charade at worst.

such objectivity and

consistency in any known performance evaluation system today simply does not exist.
F.

Performance Appraisals Encourage Internal Competition
Ideally a firm would like to focus all of its employees'

efforts on contributing to the goal of outperforming rival
firms.

However, most employees, who are not already disillu-

sioned by the system, want
in the top third.

thei~

performance appraisal to be

Obviously they all cannot be there.

None-

theless, they will try and that causes internal competition.
That competition is usually to the firm's detriment for a
variety of reasons, the most important of which may be the
loss of the competitive energy wasted on a fellow employee
rather than being directed at other firms as well as the
unhealthy interpersonal conflict generated by the internal
competition (Gabris, Mitchell and McLemore 1985, p. 232).
G.

Performance Appraisals Hinder Long-Term Planning
In an effort to improve the fairness and accuracy of per-

formance appraisals, the evaluators try to find objective
measures that are easily defined and evaluated.

Because, as

discussed above, most traditional pay systems are based in
part on performance appraisals, performance goals usually have
a term of one year or less in order to support the pay system.

Together these factors tend to foster short-term think-
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ing at the expense of long-term planning.

Of course, without

adequate long-term planning, a firm is probably doomed to
mediocre performance, if it survives at all.
Arguably, this problem of performance appraisals
focusing efforts on short-term goals at the expense of
long-term planning could have been included under the heading
of sub-optimization.

However, it is treated separately be-

cause of its importance.
H.

Performance Appraisals Are Based on a Faulty Premise
The performance appraisal system is based on the assump-

tion that each employee can substantially improve his perf ormance.

Otherwise, there would be no point in expending the

time and effort necessary to do the appraisals, conduct the
interviews, and administer the system.

However, researchers

estimate that "in most systems 80 to 85 percent of the
problems are with the system and 15 to 20 percent are with the
worker" (Tribus 1982, p. 5, emphasis in original; see also
Gitlow 1987, p. 74).
Thus, an employee may be making extraordinary efforts to
improve his performance.

However, because of external

limitations such as defective machinery or improper working
conditions that limit the employee's performance, the employee
may neither be able to improve performance nor meet
management's goals.

In such case, a below average appraisal

is more a condemnation of management's failure to correct the
limiting factor than it is of the employee's performance.
Management's failure to recognize the importance of factors
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beyond the employee's control often lead to frustration by
both management and the employee.

If it continues, the employ-

ee will become cynical and bitter toward the appraisal system
and maybe toward the firm.
I.

What Does Dr. Deming Recommend?
Dr. Deming's solution to the problem of performance ap-

praisals is to just stop doing them, or at least stop linking
pay raises to performance appraisals.
The most prevalent reason for performance appraisals has
been to establish a basis for each employee's next pay raise.
Certainly there are a number of other reasons for performance
appraisals (Scholtes 1987, pp 24-33).

However, as long as pay

is linked to performance appraisals, the employee is so concerned about the next pay raise that it is very difficult for
the employee to focus effectively on the other issues or
messages that the evaluator wants to discuss (Moen 1989, p.
62).

Furthermore, given the long standing linkage of perfor-

mance appraisals to pay increases, it is very difficult to
convince employees that performance appraisals are no longer
the basis for pay increases.

Therefore, this writer believes

that formal performance appraisals should be eliminated for at
least two years before they can be successfully reinstated for
reasons other than pay raises.
The need for managers and supervisors to give feedback and
guidance to their employees continues and has increased importance under the Deming philosophy.

Therefore, the formal

performance appraisals should be replaced by frequent, infer-
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mal coaching sessions in which managers and supervisors give
feedback, both good and bad.

Also, the sessions should be the

opportunity for the supervisor and manager to learn how to
improve the system so the employee may be more productive
(Deming 1986, pp 115-19; Finley 1988; Peters 1987, p. 495).
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III.

SELECTED DEMING PRINCIPLES

Based on Dr. Deming's writings and the previous analysis
of his criticisms of performance appraisals and their linkage
to pay raises, the following principles of the Deming philosophy are the most important for evaluating the various types of
bonus plans discussed in the following sections.
A.

Avoid Internal Competition
Previously, we discussed how employee appraisals cause

internal competition that generally hurts employee performance
and morale, and which, in turn, hurts the firm.

Thus if a

bonus system is going to work, it must be structured to avoid
internal competition.
B.

Build Teamwork
Under the Deming philosophy, there are many aspects to

building teamwork, not just reducing internal competition.
One aspect is breaking down barriers, such as internal competition and corporate inhibitions to communications between organizational units.

A second is encouraging cooperation between

individual employees, work groups, divisions, departments and
even between suppliers and customers.

Finally, and perhaps

most importantly, teamwork means using the "minds of many" to
solve problems.

c.

Seek Long-Term Continuous Improvement
As discussed previously, a bonus plan should try to

achieve long-term, continuous improvement and avoid the temptation to focus on short-term gains (Deming 1986, pp 49-52).
For example, inspecting output is usually "too late,
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ineffective and costly" (Deming 1986, pp 28-29).

Such inspec-

tion just separates good output from bad; it does not improve
the process.

Under such a system, the only way to ensure the

quality of products shipped is to carefully cull defective
output from good output.

Mass inspection is very expensive

because of the labor required plus the defective items must be
discarded or reworked.
Under the Deming philosophy, there would be two important
differences.

First, all employees dealing with the process

would be trying to determine ways to improve it (Deming 1986,
pp 49-52).

Second, to the extent possible, there would be

upstream sampling to provide early detection if the process
gets out of statistical control and to allow the employees to
correct the process to minimize production of defective
items.

Together these differences illustrate how continuous

improvement can eliminate the need for expensive mass inspections.
D.

Avoid Numerical Quotas and Goals
Numerical quotas and goals act as limits rather than incen-

tives.

As an example, consider production work standards,

which are usually set for the average worker.

This means that

half are capable of producing more than the standard but they
do not because of peer pressure.

The other half cannot make

the standard, so they are dissatisfied and may leave the
company.

The company loses due to lost production by the

above-average group and high turnover in the below-average
group.

-
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Similarly, management goals may keep managers from reaching their full potential because they stop or slow down when
they reach their goal (Deming 1986, pp 70-77).
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DESCRIPTION OF BONUS PLANS

This section describes the various bonus plans to lay a
foundation for applying the selected Deming principles discussed in the previous section.

Bonus plans come in what

Joyce Nilsson Orsini (1987) has classified as three types:
thank-you, supplemental and incentive.
A.

Thank-You Bonus
Thank-you bonuses can be sub-divided in two types.

The

first, the company-wide bonus, is usually given annually at
the end of the year as a thank-you for service during the
year.
No strings are attached.

The amount of the

bonus is usually tied to company profits or
sales and will vary with individual employees' salaries.

No attempt is made to distin-

guish between good and bad employees.

Every-

one shares in the bonus.
(Orsini 1987, p. 180).
The second type of thank-you bonus, the individual bonus,
is awarded for some singularly important contribution to the
company.

It may be made at any time and is not planned by

management.

Therefore, it is not anticipated by the employees

(Orsini 1987, p. 180).
B.

Supplemental Bonus
Supplemental bonuses are usually designed to augment the

salaries of the chief executive officer or other senior officers whose salaries have leveled off or are at the top of their
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range.

Sometimes it is easier to convince the board of

directors to distribute a one year bonus that is a fraction of
the profits in a good year than it is to convince the board
that base salaries should be raised.

Often supplemental bo-

nuses are recommended to the board on the basis that the senior officers receiving them will work harder to increase
prof its in the future so that they may receive future bonuses.

Thus, the supplemental bonus is often just a disguised

incentive bonus.

c.

Incentive Bonus
Incentive bonuses may have any of a myriad of structures.

The common feature of all incentive bonus plans is that extra
pay is given either for exceeding one's own predetermined
goals or for out-performing some other group or individual
when measured by predetermined criteria.

Incentive bonuses

can be divided into five types:
Individual incentive
Small group incentive
Gain sharing
Profit sharing
Pay-for-knowledge
1.

Individual Incentive
An individual incentive bonus is the most basic.

The

employee receives additional pay for exceeding a predetermined
goal, such as total sales, amount of production, good attendance, low number of defective items or low scrap rate.

In

its most competitive form, an employee may receive a bonus for

-
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exceeding fellow employees' performance as measured by the
same criteria.
An individual incentive bonus may be made as frequently as weekly or as seldom as once a year.

Wageroll em-

ployees tend to receive their incentive bonus more frequently
than salaried employees.

A study by Carla O'Dell (1987)

showed that 28% of American companies had individual incentive
pay plans.

The study indicated that the use of individual

incentive bonuses for hourly workers was decreasing and its
use for sales support staff, professional workers, managers
and supervisors was increasing.

Approximately half of the

company's surveyed indicated that they planned to increase the
use of individual incentive bonuses over the next five years
for those categories of employees (pp 58-61).
2.

Small Group Incentive
Small group incentive bonuses reflect the fact that

recently more and more work is done by groups rather than by
individuals.

Thus, if a group's performance exceeds its work

standards or goals, it is rewarded with an incentive bonus.
Also a small group incentive bonus may be paid to the group
that exceeds other groups' performance as measured by predetermined criteria.

Group incentive bonuses may be paid as fre-

quently as weekly and as seldom as annually.

Approximately

14% of American companies use small group incentive bonuses
and this figure is growing.

Of those companies that have

small group incentive bonus plans, 34% reported that they give
an equal number of dollars to each employee in the group and

-
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30% reported that each employee got an equal percentage of his
or her base earnings.

The other 36% reported distribution on

some other formula (O'Dell 1987, p. 54).
3.

Gain Sharing
The concept of gain sharing was conceived in the

1930s by Joseph N. Scanlon, who was a local union president at
a steel mill that was on the verge of closing because of competition by more efficient companies.

After extensive discus-

sions between the United steelworkers and his company management, they adopted Scanlon's plan to reduce labor costs by
tying wages directly to productivity.

The workers base pay

was reduced, but they received a bonus in proportion to the
extent productivity exceeded a predetermined level.

The

Scanlon Plan is credited with improving the plant's
productivity and saving it from liquidation (DeBettignies
1989, pp 287-88).
Although gain sharing plans are not commonly thought
of as incentive bonuses, they should be because they have all
the elements of incentive bonuses--additional money is paid
for superior performance in order to encourage even better
performance.

In fact, gain sharing plans could be called

large group incentive bonuses except they cover larger organizational units--a whole plant, a division or even a whole
company.

The optimum size was thought to be 500-1,000 employ-

ees (Schuster 1987, p. 20).

Surprisingly, research by O'Dell

(1987) determined that the average number of employees in gain
sharing plans was 5,220 with the largest being 94,000 (p. 35).
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In 1987, approximately 13% of American companies had gain
sharing plans and that figure was growing {O'Dell 1987,
8).

p.

Nearly 35% of the firms using gain sharing plans reported

that all employees in their organizational unit are given the
gain sharing reward {O'Dell 1987, p. 36).

Payments are made

weekly, monthly, quarterly or annually.
To determine whether and how much money should be
distributed under a gain sharing plan, there must be a formula.

Probably there are nearly as many formulas as there are

gain sharing plans.
two groups.

Most of the formulas can be divided into

First, physical formulas "reward employees for

improving the relationship between physical units of output
and physical units of input," for instance, hours of labor or
tons of raw material (Belcher 1986, p. 2-12).

Improshare,

which was developed by Mitchell Fein, is the best known gain
sharing plan based on a physical formula.

It is a characteris-

tic (but not a criticism) of physical formulas that the organizational unit may earn a payment under the plan, because of
high production, even though the company earned little, if
any, profit (e.g., due to a price decrease) during the
applicable period (Belcher 1986, p. 2-12).
The second group of gain sharing plans use financial
formulas.

In these formulas, the payment is based primarily

on the financial performance of the organizational unit or the
whole company.

The formula may still relate output to input,

but it does so in terms of dollars, such as the ratio of sales
to payroll.
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The Scanlon Plan and the Rucker Plan are the best
known gain sharing plans that use financial formulas.

The

Scanlon Plan rewards employees for improving the ratio of
payroll costs to sales value of production (sales adjusted for
inventory changes).

The Rucker Plan is a bit more complex,

basing bonuses on improvements in the ratio of payroll costs
to value added (sales value of production less purchased materials and services) .

As with any financially based system,

bonuses generated under these plans are affected by changes in
selling price and product mix as well as by productivity improvements.
The Rucker formula inserts an additional element into
the gain sharing picture.

Since gains are measured in terms

of improvements in value added, bonuses may be earned by employees through reductions in purchased materials and services
as well as through improvements in labor productivity.

The

Rur.ker Plan is therefore suited to manufacturing organizations
where there are significant opportunities for scrap reduction
or energy conservation (Belcher 1986, p. 2-12).
The philosophical differences between the two types
of formulas are that physical formulas tend to emphasize factors that are more likely to be within the employees' control.

The financial formulas are based on the concept that

all employees in an organization have a common economic fate
so their compensation should rise and fall with that of the
organization (Belcher 1986, p. 2-12).

-
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Recently, a third group of formulas is emerging.
This group involves not just one measure of performance, but a
series of factors.

Thus, employee attention is drawn to a

more representative array of critical issues affecting the
organizational unit's performance, such as production cost,
quality, delivery, inventory and safety (Belcher 1986, p.
2-13).
4.

Profit Sharing
Profit sharing is also a form of incentive bonus

because a bonus is paid when the company's performance meets
or exceeds certain predetermined levels in order to induce
even better performance.

Profit sharing is the ultimate finan-

cially based gain sharing plan.
ing differ primarily in emphasis.

Gain sharing and profit sharMost gain sharing plans

seek productivity gains, while profit sharing emphasizes
improved profitability.

In 1987, 32% of American companies

had profit sharing plans (O'Dell 1987, p. 8).
The roots of profit sharing can be traced to an 1887
Procter & Gamble program that:
divided profits between the company and its
workers in the same proportion that labor
costs bore to total costs (in an era, remember, when labor costs were a much bigger
slice of the pie than today).

That is, if

wages were 50 percent of all costs, the workers' bonus would be one-half of profits.
President Cooper Procter stated at the time:
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"The chief problem of big business today is
to shape its policies so that each worker
will feel that he is a vital part of his
company with a personal responsibility for
its success and a chance to share in that
success."
(Peters 1987, p. 333, emphasis added by Peters).
Historically, profit sharing bonuses were usually
distributed once a year in the form of company stock that was
placed in the retirement fund.

Because such distributions had

such a remote impact on employees, they had little, if any,
motivational value.
Recently, there is a growing number of companies that
are paying prof it sharing bonuses to employees in cash
(Belcher 1986, pp 2-13).

Although this change is an attempt

to increase the motivational value of profit sharing bonuses,
i~s

chances of success are dubious.

When the profit sharing

bonus is paid just once a year and usually at least several
weeks after the close of the fiscal year, the connection between the year's efforts and the bonus is sufficiently attenuated that any incentive is probably lost.
5.

Pay-for-Knowledge

Under a pay-for-knowledge plan, an employee gets a bonus
in the form of a raise each time he or she demonstrates prof iciency either in a higher skill level within a current job or
in a new job.

Usually there are some restrictions on how

frequently a person can obtain a pay-for-knowledge raise.
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rationale for a pay-for-knowledge system is that it rewards
employees who are self-motivated enough to learn new skills.
The firm benefits from having a more highly skilled work force
that can readily move from job to job as production schedules
and absenteeism demand (Jenkins 1985, pp 121-24).
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V.

WHAT ARE THE PURPOSES OF BONUS PLANS AND ARE
THEY COMPATIBLE WITH THE DEMING PHILOSOPHY?

All bonus plans ultimately have one purpose--to improve
the long term economic well-being of the firm.

This is appro-

priate because that purpose is in furtherance of the firm's
primary functions, which are to increase shareholder value and
to maintain and create economically viable employment.

Some

of the stated purposes of bonus plans have a fairly direct
impact on the firm's economic well-being and for others the
impact is indirect.

More specifically, the impacts on the

organization include the following:
A.

Direct (improve profitability, productivity, quality

and competitiveness)
1.

2.

Improve output of goods and services
a.

Increase production

b.

Reduce defective items

Reduce costs
a.

Reduce cost of labor and benefits

b.

Reduce waste

c.

Reduce energy costs

d.

Reduce inefficiency

e.

Gain flexibility to reduce labor costs
easily when business is doing poorly

B.

Indirect
1.

organizational change
a.

Foster individual, team, group and interdepartmental cooperation
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2.

b.

Reinforce employee involvement

c.

Spread decision-making

Employee matters
a.

Reward employee suggestions and creativity

b.

Increase employee skills

c.

Attract most talented employees

d.

Reduce absenteeism

e.

Reduce turnover

f.

Reduce layoffs

g.

Reduce grievances

The overall purpose of improving the economic
well-being of the firm and the more specific purposes listed
above are all compatible with the Deming philosophy.

The only

incompatibility might be if the purpose of a bonus plan could
be interpreted as promoting a quick (but usually temporary)
increase in profits rather than sustainable, long-run profitability (Deming 1986, pp 99-101; Roberts 1988, p. 2).
Thus studying the purposes of bonus plans does not
help us determine which bonus plans are compatible with the
Deming philosophy and which are not.
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VI.

WHICH BONUS PLANS ARE COMPATIBLE
WITH THE DEMING PHILOSOPHY?

In this section, the selected Deming principles discussed
in Section III are used to evaluate each of the bonus plans
described in Section IV.
A.

Thank-You Bonus
1.

Company-Wide
The company-wide thank-you bonus is compatible with

the Deming philosophy.

It shares with the employees the

economic gains realized by the company without causing
internal competition so long as the bonus is paid in what the
employees perceive as a fair and equitable manner.

This

usually means that, whatever formula is used to distribute the
bonus, it is applied company-wide, or at least it is the same
for all employees within a business unit if there are
independent business units within the corporation.
In addition, a company-wide thank-you bonus does not
violate the other three Deming principles.

In fact, such a

bonus may reinforce company efforts to encourage teamwork and
long-term continuous improvement.

Finally, even if the group

that determines how to distribute the bonus uses a numerical
formula, the last Deming principle (avoid numerical quotas and
goals) will not be violated if the employees are not given the
formula far enough ahead of time that they can adjust their
behavior in an attempt to enlarge their share of the bonus
pool.
It is interesting to note that many Japanese firms
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use the company-wide thank-you bonus.

Bonuses are paid twice

a year, in August just before the summer holiday and at the
first of the year when the Japanese buy New Year's gifts.

On

an annualized basis, the bonuses average 4.7 months salary,
which is 28% of the workers' total income (Schultz 1985, pp
8-9).
2.

Individual
Whether an individual thank-you bonus is compatible

with the Deming philosophy is not as clear as the company-wide
bonus.

Although the individual bonus is unplanned and, there-

fore, is not likely to cause employees to maneuver in order to
earn it, the public act of awarding an individual bonus could
be contrary to the first twu principles (avoid internal
competition and build teamwork).
awarding such a bonus.

Two groups could be hurt by

The first includes employees who think

their efforts were at least as important to the firm as those
of the individual who received the bonus.

The second group

includes those who contributed to the activity that was the
basis for the award but who did not receive part of the
bonus.

As a result, prior teamwork and cooperation involving

the bonus recipient would at least be curtailed.

Even worse,

the teamwork could be replaced by internal competition.
The problems with an individual incentive bonus could
be reduced by making the award privately.

The recipient would

have to be asked to keep the award confidential, which is
probably unlikely in most instances.

However, assuming that

the bonus did remain confidential, then the employee who made

-
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an extraordinary contribution to the firm would receive a
reinforcing acknowledgment by the company, but his or her
fellow employees would not have the unwanted negative
reactions.
B.

Supplemental Bonus
As previously discussed, supplemental bonuses are really

either in lieu of base salary or a disguised incentive bonus.
A supplemental bonus that is in lieu of salary is compatible
with the Deming philosophy because, like most raises, it would
be given privately.

Therefore, it would not stimulate un-

wanted negative behavior by fellow employees.
To the extent that the recipient considers a supplemental
bonus to be a disguised incentive bonus, then it is subject to
the analysis in the next subsection.

c.

Incentive Bonus
1.

Individual Incentive
Individual incentive bonus plans are not compatible

with the Deming philosophy for several reasons.

They tend to

promote internal competition, which violates the first Deming
principle, and to be divisive, which is contrary to the Deming
goal of building teamwork.

Also, most individual incentive

bonus plans are quantity-oriented, usually at the expense of
quality (Verespej 1988, p. 41).
If an employee earned an incentive bonus by meeting a
certain work standard or goal, production beyond that level
would be limited for the reasons discussed in conjunction with
the fourth Deming principle--avoid numerical quotas and

-

35 -

,~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

!

goals.

Specifically, if the employee continued to earn a

larger bonus based on the amount of production in excess of
the standard, there would still be an incentive for the best
workers to limit production either due to peer pressure or
fear that management would raise the threshold for the
incentive bonus.
2.

Small Group Incentive
Small group incentive bonus plans do not promote

competition between individuals but they still may cause competition between groups.

If so, that would be divisive and

would thwart efforts to promote teamwork.

Similarly, if the

small group incentive bonuses have numerical quotas or goals,
they will have the same problems as individual incentive
plans.

For these reasons small group. incentive bonuses are

not compatible with the Deming philosophy.
3.

Gain Sharing
If we look at gain sharing as a large group incentive

program, then the first Deming principle will be met if the
group is sufficiently independent of other groups in the company that there is no chance of competition between groups.

A

gain sharing bonus plan should encourage teamwork because
group members will be inclined to cooperate and use the minds
of many to solve problems that will enlarge their gain sharing
bonus (Ross, Hatcher and Ross 1989, pp 23-24; Finlay 1990).
Whether a gain sharing plan will promote long-term
continuous improvement is a difficult question.

Historically,

most gain sharing plans have been aimed at increasing produc-

-

36 -

r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

tivity through readily measurable criteria, which usually have
a short-term orientation.

Such gain sharing formulas are not

compatible with the Deming philosophy.

However, by carefully

selecting the criteria in the formula, it is possible to
promote a longer-term perspective.

Examples of criteria that

tend to have a longer-term focus are increasing the number of
defect-free items produced, reducing the amount of scrap
produced, reducing the statistical variability of key
processes, and reducing the number of customers lost.

Using

financially based rather than physically based criteria will
also help decrease the emphasis on the short term.

The selec-

tion of such criteria would be highly dependent on the goals
and culture of each individual firm.
Unfortunately, there is no way to administer a gain
sharing plan without having numerical formulas.

However, we

should not condemn gain sharing because it violates that single Deming principle.

Most of the problems can be resolved by

ensuring that all criteria have an incentive for continuous
improvement, not just meeting some threshold.

Another factor

is to use several criteria in the gain sharing formula to
avoid having the employees focus on a single criterion at the
expense of other factors that are critical to the business.
For these reasons, gain sharing is not fully compatible with all of the Deming principles.

However, if it is

carefully conceived and administered to make adjustments in
the formula when it seems to be encouraging unwanted employee
efforts, then gain sharing may be compatible with implementation of the Deming philosophy.
-
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4.

Profit Sharing
The analysis of prof it sharing is similar to that of

gain sharing.

However, profit sharing is more likely than

gain sharing to encourage long-term continuous improvement
because its formula is financially based and payments are
usually made only once a year.

This tends to reduce the temp-

tation to work on "temporary fixes."
5.

Pay-for-Knowledge
Because a pay-for-knowledge bonus plan has an inher-

ent focus on the individual, it is likely to generate internal
competition.

Each employee will be trying to maneuver into a

position where it is easiest to demonstrate new skills.

Fur-

thermore, an employee with a certain skill may be unlikely to
cooperate with another employee and share that skill unless
they can work out an agreement to trade their knowledge.
Thus, such an environment would not be conducive to building
teamwork.
A pay-for-knowledge bonus plan would not violate the
third (seek long-term continuous improvement) and fourth
(avoid numerical quotas and goals) Deming principles.

An

employee who learns different skills would broaden his perspective and thus might be better able to offer suggestions to
improve the company's processes.

However, the company manage-

ment would also have to be receptive to, even encourage, such
employee suggestions.

Finally, there are no numerical quotas

or goals in a pay-for-knowledge plan.
On balance, it appears that a pay-for-knowledge plan
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is not compatible with the Deming principles.

However, this

is a rather new form of bonus plan, so more experience should
be gained from its use before it is dismissed from further
consideration.
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VII.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Deming made it very clear that there are a number of
problems with the way many companies administer their performance appraisal and "merit" or traditional pay systems.
Much can be learned from those criticisms to improve the traditional pay systems.
Dr. Deming is surprisingly silent about bonus plans.
However, his criticisms of how traditional pay systems are
administered, plus certain other principles of the Deming
philosophy, provide criteria to evaluate the various types of
bonus plans.
Applying those criteria, leads to the conclusion the..'·.
company-wide thank-you and profit sharing bonuses are generally compatible with the Deming philosophy.

On the other

hand, the following types of bonuses are not compatible:
individual incentive, small group incentive and
pay-for-knowledge.

Individual thank-you, supplemental and

gain sharing bonuses may or may not he compatible, depending
on how they are structured and administered.
Thus, if management decides to share improved profits with
its employees, it may do so with either company-wide thank-you
or profit sharing bonuses and be assured that they are not
violating the Deming philosophy.

A company may also use an

individual thank-you, supplemental or gain sharing bonus if it
exercises special care to ensure that it is structured and
administered to be compatible with the Deming philosophy.

-

40 -

REFERENCES

Belcher, John G. (1986), "Gainsharing: Designed for success,"
Productivity Brief published by American Productivity
Center (May).
Brophy, Beth (1986), "The Rite of Annual Reviews," U.S. News

& World Report, 100:4 (February 3) 59.
Chew, W. Bruce, "No Nonsense Guide to Measuring Productivity,"
Harvard Business Review, 66 (January-February), 110-18.
Couper, David

c. (1988), "Promoting Teamwork Today Ensures

Success Tomorrow," Wisconsin state Journal, (June 5) __ •
DeBettignies, Charles W. (1989), "Improving OrganizationWide Teamwork Through Gainsharing," National Productivity
Review, 8:3 (Summer) 287-94.
Deming, W. Edwards (198_), "The Merit system:

The Annual

Appraisal: Destroyer of People," unpublished paper, Graduate School of Business Administration, New York University.
(1986), Out of the crisis, Cambridge, Mass:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Advanced
Engineering study.
Finlay, Joel s. (1988), "Leadership: Implications for a
Deming-Transformed Organization," Process Management Institute, Inc., presented at the 18th Annual Information Exchange of the Organization Development Institute, Williams
Bay, Wisconsin, (May 17-20).
(1990), Process Management Institute, Inc.,
private communication (April 2).

Gabris, Gerald T., Kenneth Mitchell and Ronald McLemore
(1985), "Rewarding Individual and Team Productivity: The
Biloxi Merit Bonus Plan," Public Personnel Management,
14:3 (Fall) 231-43.
Gitlow, Howards. and Shelly J. Gitlow (1987), The Deming
Guide to Quality and Competitive Position, Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Grayson,

c. Jackson, Jr. and Carla O'Dell (1988), American

Business: A Two-Minute Warning, New York: The Free Press.
Hughes, Charles L. (1986), "The Demerit of Merit," Personnel
Administrator, 31:6 (June)

~o.

Jenkins, G. Doughlas, Jr. and Nina Gupta (1985), "The Payoffs
of Paying for Knowledge," National Productivity Review,
4:2 (Spring) 121-30.
Moen, Ronald D. (1989), "The Performance Appraisal System:
Deming's Deadly Disease,: Quality Progress, 22:11
(November), 63-68.
O'Dell, Carla (1987), People, Performance and Pay, Houston:
American Productivity Center.
O'Dell, Carla and C. Jackson Grayson, Jr. (1988), "Flex Your
Pay Muscle," Across the Board, 25:7,8 (July/August),
43-48.
Orsini, Joyce Nilsson (1987), "Bonuses: What is the Impact?,"
National Productivity Review, 6 (Spring), 180.
Perry, Nancy J. (1988), "Here Come Richer, Riskier Pay Plans,"
Fortune, 118:14 (December 19) 50.
Peters, Tom (1985), "Performance Appraisals Should Be Day to
Day," Minneapolis Star and Tribune, (August 27) lOB.

(1987), Thriving on Chaos, New York: Alfred A.
Knopj.
Roberts, Harry V. (1988), "Quality and Productivity:
Indications for Management," reprinted by American Productivity Center from Selected Paper Number 65, The University of Chicago Graduate School of Business.
Ross, Timothy L., Larry Hatcher and Ruth Ann Ross (1989),
"The Incentive Switch: "From Piecework to Companywide
Gainsharing," Management Review, 78:5 (May) 22-26.
Scholtes, Peter R. (1987), "A new View of Performance
Evaluation," paper presented at William G. Hunter Conference on Quality, 12-13 (November), Joiner Associates,
Inc., Madison, WI.
Schultz, Louis E. (1985), "Compensations in a Collaborative
Society," Minneapolis: Process Management Institute, Inc.,
draft paper, (November 11).
Shuster, Michael (1987), "Gain Sharing: Do It Right the First
Time," Sloan Management Review, 28:2 (Winter) 17-25.
Tribus, Myron (1982), "Deming's Way," Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, reprinted by Process Management Institute,
Bloomington, Minnesota.
Verespej, Michael A. (1988), "Bluecollar Incentives," Industry
Week, 237:1 (July 4) 41-46.
Winstanley, Nathan B. (1982), "Are Merit Increases Really
Effective," Personnel Administrator, 27:4 (April) 37-41.

